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Encouraging Medicare Advantage Enrollees to
Switch to Higher Quality Plans: Assessing the
Effectiveness of a ‘‘Nudge’’ Letter
Benjamin L. Howell, PhD, Partha Deb, PhD, Sai Ma, PhD, Rachel O. Reid, MD, Jesse Levy,
PhD, Gerald F. Riley, MSPH, Patrick H. Conway, MD, William H. Shrank, MD
There are considerable quality differences across private
Medicare Advantage insurance plans, so it is important
that beneficiaries make informed choices. During open
enrollment for the 2013 coverage year, the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services sent letters to beneficiaries
enrolled in low-quality Medicare Advantage plans (i.e.,
plans rated less than 3 stars for at least 3 consecutive
years by Medicare) explaining the stars and encouraging
them to reexamine their choices. To understand the effec-
tiveness of these low-cost, behavioral ‘‘nudge’’ letters, we
used a beneficiary-level national retrospective cohort and
performed multivariate regression analysis of plan selec-
tion during the 2013 open enrollment period among those
enrolled in plans rated less than 3 stars. Our analysis
controls for beneficiary demographic characteristics,
health and health care spending risks, the availability of
alternative higher rated plan options in their local market,
and historical disenrollment rates from the plans. We
compared the behaviors of those beneficiaries who
received the nudge letters with those who enrolled in sim-
ilar poorly rated plans but did not receive such letters. We
found that beneficiaries who received the nudge letter
were almost twice as likely (28.0% [95% confidence
interval = 27.7%, 28.2%] vs. 15.3% [95% confidence
interval = 15.1%, 15.5%]) to switch to a higher rated plan
compared with those who did not receive the letter. White
beneficiaries, healthier beneficiaries, and those residing
in areas with more high-performing plan choices were
more likely to switch plans in response to the nudge. Our
findings highlight both the importance and efficacy of
providing timely and actionable information to benefici-
aries about quality in the insurance marketplace to facili-
tate informed and value-based coverage decisions. Key
words: Medicare Advantage; quality measures; health
insurance; insurance enrollment. (MDM Policy &
Practice XXXX;XX:xx–xx)
As the single largest payer for health care in theUnited States, Medicare provided insurance to
more than 50 million Americans in 2015. While the
majority still enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service
Medicare, approximately 31% of Medicare benefici-
aries enrolled in privately administered managed care
plans (such as a health maintenance organization or
preferred provider organization) under the Medicare
Advantage program. Beneficiaries in such policies
received all Medicare-covered Part A and Part B bene-
fits, and often Part D benefits.1 The number and share
of enrollees in Medicare Advantage program have
continued to increase through the past decade.2
There are considerable quality differences across
these Medicare Advantage plans. In order to make
plan quality information accessible and interpreta-
ble to beneficiaries, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) constructs and publishes
a quality rating for Medicare Advantage plans to
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provide information about the quality of various
insurance options. This rating, which started in
2008 and has incrementally evolved over the subse-
quent years, assigns a rating of 1 to 5 stars in half
star increments to plans under Medicare Advantage
contracts annually. Star Ratings are currently based
on performance on more 50 quality indicators,
including process-based quality via Healthcare
Effectiveness Data and Information Set measures
(such as colorectal cancer screening or plan all-
cause readmission), enrollee experience with care
and plans via Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Provider and Systems surveys (such as ‘‘getting
appointments and care quickly’’), enrollee self-
reported health outcome measures from the Health
Outcome Survey (such as ‘‘improving or maintain-
ing physical health’’), and other administrative data
(such as enrollee complaints and voluntary disen-
rollment).3 Individual measures are then aggregated
to construct a single overall 5-star scale for each con-
tract, representing its overall quality performance.
CMS publishes the Star Ratings on the Medicare
Plan Finder website and plans often reference them
in their own marketing materials. The Star Ratings
only focuses on quality measures; it does not account
for insurance plans’ financial structure, network
appropriateness, or coverage generosity (plans need
to meet CMS’s respective requirements on these
aspects and pass annual auditing before they can
operate under Medicare Advantage).
One recent study demonstrated a relationship
between Star Ratings and Medicare Advantage
enrollment, suggesting that at least some benefici-
aries consider quality in their decision making.4 Yet
9% of Medicare Advantage enrollments were in
plans rated 2.5 stars or less in 2012.5 While some
beneficiaries may choose these plans due to cost or
coverage concerns, others may be unaware of their
plan’s rating or that higher quality options are avail-
able.6 Furthermore, beneficiaries may face consider-
able inertia in switching plans7,8 due to the com-
plexity of Medicare coverage decisions.9
In Fall 2012, during the 2013 Medicare
Advantage open enrollment period, for the first
time, CMS began sending letters (in English and
Spanish) to all beneficiaries enrolled in plans that
received less than 3 stars for the last 3 consecutive
years to notify them of their plan’s low rating and
suggest consideration of other coverage options
for 2013.10 The nudge letter addressed to each indi-
vidual directly by name and Medicare number
explained what the stars meant, and explicitly
noted:
You are currently enrolled in \Organization’s
name.’s \Plan name.. \Organization’s name.
has been rated ‘‘below average’’ or ‘‘poor’’ for at
least the last three years. We encourage you to com-
pare this plan to other options in your area and
decide if it is still the right choice for you.
The letter then offered information on how to
find other available plans, and how to enroll.
Under CMS policy, however, these ‘‘nudge’’ let-
ters were not sent to beneficiaries whose plans were
rated less than 3 stars for a period less than 3 con-
secutive years. For example, a beneficiary enrolled
in a plan that was rated for 3, 2.5, and 2.5 stars in
the past 3 years would not have received a nudge
letter, whereas a beneficiary enrolled in a plan that
received a star rating of 2.5, 2.5, and 2.5 over the
past 3 years would have received one. This outreach
policy provides us a unique opportunity to compare
the enrollment behaviors of beneficiaries who
received the nudge letters with those enrolled in
similarly low-rated plans that did not receive the
letters. Understanding the implications of such
communication is essential for policy makers to
promote desired changes in the health insurance
marketplace.
In sectors outside of health care, targeted commu-
nication to support effective decision making has
been extensively studied,11–16 yet such research in
the US health care system remains underdeveloped.
In this article, we used a beneficiary-level retrospec-
tive cohort to study the association between direct




We performed a national beneficiary-level retro-
spective cohort analysis of Medicare Advantage
plan selections during the 2013 open enrollment
period among beneficiaries who were enrolled in
plans rated less than 3 stars. To measure the associ-
ation between CMS’s nudge letter and subsequent
plan switching, we exploited the fact that the letters
were only sent out to beneficiaries enrolled in
Medicare Advantage plans with quality scores less
than 3 stars for 3 consecutive years, making benefi-
ciaries who enrolled in low-rated plans but did
not receive the letters a viable comparison group.
This contrast allows us to better understand the
effectiveness of the CMS policy initiative to
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‘‘nudge’’ beneficiaries out of consistently low per-
forming plans.
Data
We obtained information on beneficiary enroll-
ments and characteristics from CMS’s Integrated
Data Repository and information on plan star rat-
ings, nudge letter, and market characteristics from
CMS’s Health Plan Management System.
We included all Medicare beneficiaries living in
the 50 US states and Puerto Rico who were enrolled
in a Medicare Advantage plan with an overall qual-
ity rating of less than 3 stars on 1 December 2012
and still enrolled in the Medicare program on 1
January 2013. We excluded beneficiaries living in
the remaining outlining US territories and posses-
sions due to idiosyncrasies in Medicare program
administration and data collection in these areas,
beneficiaries enrolled in plans sponsored by for-
mer employers due to strong incentives to remain
in these plans notwithstanding ratings, and dually
eligible beneficiaries due to potential influence of
state Medicaid policy on enrollment. We also
excluded young disabled beneficiaries as their
health conditions might lead to strong preferences
toward specific plan options and beneficiaries
with end-stage renal disease as they face some
restrictions in Medicare Advantage enrollment. We
additionally excluded beneficiaries who moved to
a different service area (i.e., county) between 2012
and 2013 as enrollment changes were likely due to
the move itself and beneficiaries whose enroll-
ments were administratively switched to a differ-
ent coverage option (e.g., changes plan service
areas, plan consolidations, plan terminations, ben-
eficiary failures to pay premiums, administrative
corrections, etc.). Finally, we excluded a small
number of beneficiaries (N = 47) who did not have
access to a higher rated plan coverage option in
their local market.
Variables
We conceptualized a beneficiary’s decision to
switch their enrollment as a function of 1) whether
they received the nudge from CMS to switch, 2)
demographic characteristics, 3) health and health
care spending risk, and 4) the availability of alterna-
tive high-quality coverage options in their local
market.
Our primary outcome was whether the benefi-
ciary continued their current Medicare Advantage
Plan enrollment or switched to a different plan
rated 2.5 stars or less, to a plan rated 3 stars or
higher, to an unrated Medicare Advantage plan, or
to fee-for-service Medicare in January 2013.
Beneficiary exposure to the nudge was signified via
a flag indicating whether the beneficiary was
enrolled in a plan rated less than 3 stars for at least
3 consecutive years on 1 December 2012.
We controlled for beneficiary demographic char-
acteristics, including age groups (65–70, 70–75, 75–
80, 80–85, 85+), race (white, black, other), and gen-
der. Since changes in health and subsequent health
care spending can also precipitate changes in plan
enrollments, we accounted for each beneficiary’s
health care spending risk via CMS’s Hierarchical
Condition Category risk score17 for 2012 (by quin-
tile) and changes in this risk score between 2011
and 2012 (by quintile, flagging beneficiaries who
were new to Medicare in 2012) in our model. We
additionally controlled for disability status.
To account for the availability of high-quality
alternative Medicare Advantage plans, we counted
the number of plans rated 3 stars or higher available
in each beneficiary’s service area (i.e., county of
residence). Finally, to control for potential differ-
ences in underlying disenrollment patterns between
plans subject to the nudge and those that were not,
we also included each plan’s 2012 disenrollment
rate as a proxy for unobserved plan characteristics
other than the nudge letters that could have driven
disenrollment.
Statistical Model
We used multinomial logistic regression to esti-
mate the relationship between receiving the nudge
from CMS and the likelihood of the various subse-
quent enrollment options. The multinomial out-
come variable distinguishes individuals who did
not switch plan from those who switched to a dif-
ferent plan rated 2.5 stars or less, to a plan rated 3
stars or higher, to an unrated Medicare Advantage
plan, or to fee-for-service Medicare. As covariates,
we included all the control variables described
above and a full set of interactions between the
nudge indicator and all the beneficiary and market
characteristics in our model. Therefore, the multi-
nomial logit specification allows estimates of the
association of the nudge with subsequent enroll-
ment to vary by subpopulation. Coefficients from
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multinomial logit models are difficult to interpret
even in the simplest cases, and they are virtually
impossible to interpret directly when covariate
interactions are included. Therefore, for purposes of
interpretation, we calculated predicted probabilities
of enrollment status given receipt and nonreceipt of
the nudge and the marginal effects of the nudge for
each level of each of the qualitative covariates. For
each of the two continuous covariates—number of
3+ star plans in the market and 2012 disenrollment
rate—we calculated the predicted probabilities and
marginal effects at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and
90th percentile values of those variables. For each
of these measures, we calculated 95% confidence
intervals based on estimates of standard errors of
the predicted probabilities and marginal effects
using the Delta method.
RESULTS
After applying exclusion criteria, our sample
included 150,095 beneficiaries who received the
nudge letters and 155,327 who did not. The study
sample had a lower percentage of whites, was older,
less sick, and had higher income than the general
Medicare population in 2012,18 consistent with
selection into Medicare Advantage plans, and addi-
tionally into low-quality Medicare Advantage plans.
Overall, nudge recipients and nonrecipients
appeared to be similar across the characteristics that
we measured. The biggest difference we observed
was in the beneficiary race category, with white
beneficiaries appearing to have received the nudge
letter more frequently than not (46.0% vs. 40.2%).
Minorities, on the other hand, appeared to have
received the nudge relatively less frequently than
not (15.4% vs. 19.7% for beneficiaries who were
black and 38.5% vs. 40.2% for beneficiaries classi-
fied as other). Nudge letter recipients were slightly
older and had slightly higher levels of health care
spending risk as compared with those who did not
receive the nudge. We did not observe substantial
differences by gender, disability status, change in
levels of health care spending risk, and number of
available plans rated 3 stars or higher (Table 1).
In unadjusted analyses, we observed differences
in subsequent enrollments by nudge receipt.
Beneficiaries who received the nudge enrolled in a
plan rated 3 stars or higher more frequently than
those who did not (25.6% vs. 13.2%). Similarly,
beneficiaries who did not receive the nudge con-
tinued their current Medicare Advantage plan
enrollment more often than those who did receive
the nudge (78.9% vs. 55.2%) (Table 1).
Using the multinomial logistic model to adjust
for observed characteristics of beneficiaries and
plans, we found that beneficiaries who did not
receive the nudge were much more likely to remain
in their current plan as compared with those who
received the nudge: 77.3% (95% confidence inter-
val [CI] = 77.0%, 77.5%) versus 57.3% (95% CI =
57.1%, 57.6%). Most of the enrollment changes
observed were toward higher rated plan options
with beneficiaries receiving the nudge being more
likely to switch to a plan rated 3 stars or more
(28.0% [95% CI = 27.7%, 28.2%] vs. 15.3% [95%
Table 1 Descriptive Characteristics of the Sample
No Nudge Nudge
N 155,327 150,095
No switch 78.9% 55.2%
Switch to 2 to 2.5 star plan 3.6% 7.6%
Switch to 3+ star plan 14.1% 29.4%
Switch to unrated 1.0% 4.1%














Not disabled 96.7% 96.3%
Disabled 3.4% 3.7%
Health care spending risk
First spending risk quintile 22.7% 21.5%
Second spending risk quintile 24.1% 22.0%
Third spending risk quintile 19.2% 19.1%
Fourth spending risk quintile 17.9% 18.8%
Fifth spending risk quintile 16.2% 18.7%
Change in health care spending risk
First spending risk change quintile 16.4% 18.9%
Second spending risk change quintile 21.0% 21.0%
Third spending risk change quintile 19.7% 18.0%
Fourth spending risk change quintile 19.5% 18.5%
Fifth spending risk change quintile 16.3% 17.3%
New in 2012 7.2% 6.4%
# of 3 star+ plans 23.7 24.3
Previous disenrollment rate 12.4% 17.1%
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CI = 15.1%, 15.5%]). We also observed slightly
higher rates of enrollment among nudge recipients
into plans that were rated 2 stars, plans that were
unrated, and into the fee-for-service Medicare pro-
gram (Figure 1).
Our adjusted analyses also revealed differences
in subsequent enrollment by beneficiary race,
health care cost risk, and number of available higher
quality enrollment options. Rates of switching do
not vary substantively by age or gender. However,
in response to the nudge, white beneficiaries had
the highest probability of switching out of their cur-
rent plan and into a plan rated 3 stars or higher
(Table 2). Nudges to white beneficiaries were asso-
ciated with a 15.7% (95% CI = 15.2%, 16.2%)
increased probability of switching enrollment to a
plan rated 3 stars or higher. In contrast, nudges to
black beneficiaries led to a 10.5% (95% CI = 9.9%,
11.0%) increase in switches to 3 stars or better plans
and nudges to those who were classified as other race
resulted in an increase in switching to 3 stars or better
plans of 10.3% (95% CI = 9.9%, 10.8%). Second, dis-
abled beneficiaries were slightly more likely to switch
to 3 stars or better plans following a nudge (14.0%
[95% CI = 12.4%, 15.5%] vs. 12.6% [95% CI =
12.3%, 12.9%]. Beneficiaries with higher health care
spending risk appeared to be less likely to switch
their enrollment to a plan rated 3 stars or higher.
Those in the first quintile of health care spending risk
who received a nudge were 24.4% (95% CI = 23.4%,
24.5%) less likely not to switch compared to 12.4%
(95% CI = 11.6%, 13.3%) among those in the fifth
quintile. The association between nudge receipt and
switching enrollments to a plan rated 3 stars or higher
also diminishes with increased health care spending
risk. The difference in probabilities of switching to a
plan rated 3 stars or higher between nudge recipients
and nonrecipients fell from 16.4% points among
those in the first quintile of risk to 9.1% points for
those in the fifth (Table 2).
The availability of 3+ stars options in the local
market appears to be an important determinant of
switching. Beneficiaries with more plan options
rated 3 stars or higher in their local market were
more likely to switch their enrollment to a plan
rated 3 stars or higher. Those in markets at the 10th
percentile of available ‘‘good’’ options (9 plans)
increased the probability of switching to a 3+ stars
plan by 7.9% (95% CI = 7.5%, 8.3%), compared to
20.5% (95% CI = 19.9%, 21.1%) among those in the
90th percentile (47 plans).
Finally, we found that the associations between
the nudge and subsequent enrollment behavior are
stable across levels of historical plan disenrollment
rates (Table 2).
DISCUSSION
Knowledge of quality is essential for patients to
make educated decisions about cost, coverage, and
quality when enrolling in a health insurance plan.
Public reporting may not be sufficient because many
consumers may not observe relevant information. In
this study, we assessed the effect of a direct benefi-
ciary communication that synthesized results of plan
quality performance. CMS informed the population of
beneficiaries enrolled in consistently poor-performing
plans (i.e., those rated less than 3 stars for at least
3 consecutive years) about the opportunity to switch to
a higher performing enrollment option. Understanding
the effect of such a nudge is essential as we strive to
create a more transparent marketplace.
We found that beneficiaries who received the
nudge were approximately twice as likely to switch
to a higher rated plan as those enrolled in plans
with similarly poor ratings that did not receive the
nudge. Forty-four percent of beneficiaries who
received the nudge switched coverage options
while only 21% of those who did not receive the
nudge did so. Not all beneficiary subgroups
responded similarly to the nudge. Both white bene-
ficiaries and healthier beneficiaries (as reflected by
lower health care cost risk scores) were more likely
to switch enrollments in response to the nudge.
Figure 1 Predicted probability of switching plans. FFS = fee-for-
service.
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While the nudge letter does inform beneficiaries
of their plan’s low quality and encourage them to
compare options, it is possible that some of this
observed shift to higher quality plans may be due to
other considerations such as changing coverage
needs and costs constraints. The decision by some
to continue with existing plan enrollments, on the
other hand, may have been driven by concerns
about increased costs or having to switch providers,
and may have been entirely rational for some bene-
ficiaries. We also observed that a small number of
beneficiaries responded to the nudge by switching
to a similarly poor rated Medicare Advantage plan.
While examining the drivers of these specific cover-
age decision outcomes was beyond the scope of this
study, it does suggest that it is important to ensure
that nudged beneficiaries are equipped with the
proper tools and skills needed to make optimal cov-
erage decisions. These findings also highlight the
need for further qualitative research to better under-
stand reasons for staying in low-performing plans
and the communication approaches that may better
meet beneficiary information needs in making opti-
mal enrollment decisions.
Furthermore, it is notable that beneficiaries resid-
ing in areas with greater choice and more high-
performing plans were more likely to switch to a
higher performing option in response to the nudge.
These findings underscore the need for a robust
marketplace with multiple viable options for benefi-
ciaries, and suggest that efforts to oversimplify plan
options for beneficiaries could lead to less activated
consumer behavior. One recent study has also
reported that Medicare Advantage penetration is con-
tinuing to grow and that this growth is concentrated
in lower income counties.2 This suggests that nudge
letters could play a bigger role in driving enrollments
into higher quality plans as beneficiaries continue to
gain more coverage options over time, particularly in
potentially underserved areas.
It has been suggested that insights from beha-
vioral economics (nudges, defaults, strategically
structuring choice architecture, etc.) may be effec-
tive tools for improving health outcomes in the
health care system.19–21 Our findings add to the
growing body of literature showing the potential for
behavioral nudges to improve health care quality
and subsequent outcomes.
Prior research has shown that behavioral nudges
can improve patient health behaviors,22–26 clinical
decision making,27 and insurance coverage deci-
sions.28 CMS could consider both enhancing exist-
ing nudges with more detailed information about
available options and sending nudges to the broader
population of Medicare Advantage enrollees. For
example, future nudge letters could include listings
of higher quality options with equal or lower
expected costs than the beneficiary’s current plan
selection. In designing new nudges, however, it is
important to consider the context in which coverage
decisions will be made. One of the possible reasons
why we observed that a majority of plan switches
were to higher rated plans was that many of the cov-
erage options available to beneficiaries were rated
higher than the poorly rated plans beneficiaries
were enrolled in at baseline. CMS might not see the
same results if it were to adopt a higher quality
threshold that leaves relatively fewer opportunities
for improvement.
In addition, CMS and other organizations could
consider testing other behavioral nudges to promote
greater use of preventative services or adherence to
therapies. For example, nudge letters could be
sent to newly diagnosed diabetics encouraging
them to take advantage of Medicare’s Diabetes Self-
management Training benefit. Personalized medica-
tion adherence feedback reports incorporating
social norming cues could also be sent to benefici-
aries with chronic conditions to nudge more consis-
tent medication use.
Our study has limitations. First, while all of the
plans examined were poorly rated (i.e., less than 3
stars), it is possible that plans with at least 3 consec-
utive years of low-quality ratings may differ from
plans with low ratings for shorter periods in other
unobservable ways that may have driven higher dis-
enrollment rates, independent of the nudge. To con-
trol for potential differences in underlying disen-
rollment patterns between plans subject to the
nudge and those that were not, we included each
plan’s 2012 disenrollment rate in our model. We
considered each plan’s 2012 disenrollment rate to
be both the most proximate to coverage decisions
we were examining and broadly representative of
each plan’s overall experience. Even after adjusting
for these prior disenrollment rates, we found
that the associations between the nudge and subse-
quent enrollment behaviors were still statistically
significant.
Second, our analysis did not consider the effects
of premiums, expected out-of-pocket costs, and fea-
tures of benefit design as the focus of this research
was to evaluate the effects of the beneficiary nudges
on enrollments in the Medicare Advantage program,
not to describe the interaction between the nudge
and beneficiary and plan-level drivers of specific
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enrollment decisions. It is possible that changes in
the relative value of various coverage options may
have also contributed to beneficiary enrollment and
disenrollment patterns. It is important to note, how-
ever, that plan-specific missing information such as
premiums and coverage restrictions would bias the
Table 2 Predicted Probability of Switching Plans by Beneficiary and Market Characteristics
No Switch Switch to 2–2.5 Switch to 3+ Switch to Unrated Switch to FFS
Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI
Age
65–70 219.8 (220.4, 219.2) 3.1 (2.8, 3.4) 13.2 (12.6, 13.7) 2.6 (2.4, 2.8) 1.0 (0.7, 1.2)
70–75 219.8 (220.6, 219.1) 3.5 (3.0, 3.9) 12.4 (11.7, 13.2) 2.8 (2.4, 3.3) 1.1 (0.8, 1.4)
75–80 220.7 (221.5, 219.9) 3.9 (3.4, 4.4) 12.9 (12.1, 13.6) 3.0 (2.4, 3.5) 0.9 (0.7, 1.2)
80–85 219.3 (220.2, 218.3) 4.0 (3.4, 4.7) 11.7 (10.8, 12.6) 2.7 (2.0, 3.3) 0.9 (0.5, 1.2)
85+ 219.8 (221.0, 218.6) 4.8 (4.2, 5.4) 11.6 (10.5, 12.6) 2.3 (1.9, 2.7) 1.1 (0.6, 1.6)
Sex
Female 219.0 (219.4, 218.6) 3.3 (3.1, 3.5) 12.3 (11.9, 12.7) 2.6 (2.4, 2.7) 0.8 (0.7, 1.0)
Male 221.1 (221.6, 220.6) 3.9 (3.7, 4.2) 13.0 (12.6, 13.5) 3.0 (2.8, 3.1) 1.2 (1.0, 1.4)
Race
White 224.0 (224.5, 223.4) 3.3 (3.1, 3.6) 15.7 (15.2, 16.2) 4.3 (4.0, 4.5) 0.6 (0.4, 0.8)
Black 216.1 (216.8, 215.5) 0.6 (0.3, 0.8) 10.5 (9.9, 11.0) 4.0 (3.4, 4.5) 1.1 (0.9, 1.3)
Other 216.9 (217.4, 216.5) 4.8 (4.5, 5.1) 10.3 (9.9, 10.8) 0.7 (0.6, 0.8) 1.1 (0.9, 1.3)
Disability
Not disabled 219.8 (220.2, 219.5) 3.5 (3.3, 3.7) 12.6 (12.3, 12.9) 2.7 (2.6, 2.8) 1.0 (0.9, 1.1)
Disabled 223.5 (225.2, 221.8) 5.5 (4.6, 6.5) 14.0 (12.4, 15.5) 2.7 (2.1, 3.2) 1.3 (0.7, 2.0)
Health care spending risk
First spending risk quintile 224.4 (225.3, 223.4) 5.5 (4.8, 6.2) 14.1 (13.1, 15.1) 3.5 (2.7, 4.2) 1.4 (1.0, 1.8)
Second spending risk quintile 222.4 (223.3, 221.4) 4.4 (3.8, 5.0) 13.9 (13.0, 14.8) 2.9 (2.3, 3.5) 1.2 (0.9, 1.6)
Third spending risk quintile 220.1 (220.8, 219.3) 3.5 (3.1, 3.9) 13.0 (12.3, 13.7) 2.7 (2.4, 2.9) 0.9 (0.6, 1.1)
Fourth spending risk quintile 218.6 (219.5, 217.7) 2.7 (2.2, 3.2) 12.3 (11.5, 13.2) 2.5 (2.0, 3.1) 1.0 (0.6, 1.3)
Fifth spending risk quintile 212.4 (213.3, 211.6) 1.3 (0.9, 1.7) 9.1 (8.3, 9.8) 1.7 (1.5, 2.0) 0.3 (0.0, 0.7)
Change in health care spending risk
First spending risk
change quintile
216.4 (217.4, 215.4) 2.7 (2.2, 3.3) 10.4 (9.5, 11.3) 2.3 (1.8, 2.8) 1.0 (0.6, 1.3)
Second spending risk
change quintile
219.3 (220.2, 218.3) 3.6 (3.0, 4.2) 12.1 (11.2, 13.0) 2.6 (2.0, 3.1) 1.0 (0.6, 1.3)
Third spending risk
change quintile
220.0 (220.7, 219.2) 3.9 (3.5, 4.3) 12.3 (11.6, 13.0) 2.6 (2.4, 2.9) 1.2 (0.9, 1.5)
Fourth spending risk
change quintile
221.0 (221.9, 220.1) 3.8 (3.3, 4.4) 13.5 (12.7, 14.3) 2.6 (2.1, 3.1) 1.1 (0.7, 1.4)
Fifth spending risk
change quintile
220.7 (221.6, 219.7) 3.9 (3.3, 4.6) 13.4 (12.5, 14.4) 2.6 (2.0, 3.2) 0.7 (0.4, 1.1)
New in 2012 227.6 (229.1, 226.0) 3.2 (2.7, 3.8) 14.7 (13.3, 16.1) 9.1 (7.9, 10.4) 0.5 (20.2, 1.2)
Number of 3+ stars plan options
9 Plans (10th percentile) 215.5 (216.0, 215.1) 1.7 (1.5, 1.9) 7.9 (7.5, 8.3) 3.4 (3.2, 3.6) 2.6 (2.4, 2.8)
12 Plans (25th percentile) 216.1 (216.5, 215.7) 2.0 (1.8, 2.2) 8.9 (8.5, 9.2) 3.2 (3.1, 3.4) 2.0 (1.8, 2.2)
19 Plans (50th percentile) 217.7 (218.1, 217.4) 2.7 (2.5, 2.9) 11.2 (10.9, 11.5) 2.8 (2.7, 3.0) 0.9 (0.8, 1.1)
34 Plans (75th percentile) 222.6 (223.0, 222.2) 4.6 (4.4, 4.8) 16.2 (15.9, 16.6) 2.0 (1.9, 2.2) 20.3 (20.4, 20.1)
47 Plans (90th percentile) 227.8 (228.4, 227.2) 6.5 (6.2, 6.9) 20.5 (19.9, 21.1) 1.5 (1.3, 1.6) 20.7 (20.8, 20.5)
Prior year disenrollment rate
5.8% (10th percentile) 219.4 (219.8, 219.0) 3.8 (3.6, 4.0) 12.3 (11.9, 12.6) 2.5 (2.4, 2.7) 0.8 (0.6, 1.0)
7.7% (25th percentile) 219.7 (220.1, 219.3) 3.8 (3.6, 4.0) 12.4 (12.1, 12.8) 2.6 (2.5, 2.7) 0.8 (0.7, 1.0)
11.5% (50th percentile) 220.2 (220.5, 219.8) 3.8 (3.6, 3.9) 12.7 (12.4, 13.0) 2.7 (2.6, 2.9) 0.9 (0.8, 1.1)
18.5% (75th percentile) 220.6 (221.0, 220.3) 3.6 (3.4, 3.7) 13.0 (12.7, 13.3) 2.9 (2.8, 3.1) 1.1 (1.0, 1.2)
25.7% (90th percentile) 220.5 (221.0, 220.1) 3.3 (3.1, 3.5) 12.9 (12.5, 13.4) 3.1 (2.9, 3.2) 1.3 (1.1, 1.5)
Note: FFS = fee-for-service; CI = confidence interval.
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effect of the nudge only if they interacted with
receipt of the nudge letter. If plans that triggered the
nudge also had higher premiums, then we might
attribute effects of prices to the nudge. But if the
nudged plans had lower premiums, our findings
would be biased toward zero, that is, they would
underestimate the effect of the nudge. Similar argu-
ments would apply to other plan attributes. We
have no systematic evidence of interactions
between plan characteristics and the nudge, but
internal case studies and anecdotal evidence do not
suggest such interactions. Future research should
work to quantify these effects in more detail.
Finally, while this research showed a strong asso-
ciation between receipt of the nudge and subse-
quent switching behavior based on an empirical
analysis, it cannot establish a causal pathway
between the nudge and subsequent enrollment deci-
sions, particularly because we do not know whether
the recipients actually read the letters. Since this
was an observational study of an existing quality
reporting program, there was no ‘‘control’’ mailing
that would allow us to differentiate the effect of the
nudge letter from a general open enrollment notifi-
cation. Additionally, it is possible that other unob-
served factors related to persistently low-quality rat-
ings, such as marketing efforts from competitors,
could have also contributed to the enrollment pat-
terns that we observed, independent of the nudge.
CONCLUSION
We found that targeted beneficiary nudges were
strongly associated with beneficiary enrollment deci-
sions. The approximately twofold increase in the
rates of switching enrollments we observed in rela-
tion to the nudge highlight both the importance and
efficacy of providing timely, actionable information
to beneficiaries about quality in the Medicare
Advantage marketplace to facilitate optimal, value-
based coverage decisions. This finding also has
implications for other agencies that try to directly
convey messages and to promote informed choices.
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